Generalizing the notion of dynamic quantum secret sharing (DQSS), a simplified protocol for hierarchical dynamic quantum secret sharing (HDQSS) is proposed and it is shown that the protocol can be implemented using any existing protocol of quantum key distribution, quantum key agreement or secure direct quantum communication. The security of this proposed protocol against eavesdropping and collusion attacks is discussed with specific attention towards the issues related to the composability of the subprotocols that constitute the proposed protocol. The security and qubit efficiency of the proposed protocol is also compared with that of other existing protocols of DQSS. Further, it is shown that it is possible to design a semi-quantum protocol of HDQSS and in principle, the protocols of HDQSS can be implemented using any quantum state. It is also noted that the completely orthogonal-state-based realization of HDQSS protocol is possible and that HDQSS can be experimentally realized using a large number of alternative approaches.
Introduction
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard [1] introduced the first protocol for quantum key distribution (QKD). Since then a large number of alternative protocols of unconditionally secure QKD have been proposed [2, 3, 4, 5] and various aspects of secure quantum communication beyond QKD have been explored [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] . For example, a large number of protocols have been proposed for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [7, 8, 14, 15, 16 ], deterministic secure quantum communication (DSQC) [9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] , quantum dialogue (QD) [23, 24] , etc. All these protocols differ from each other in some specific features. While both DSQC and QSDC are used for secure direct quantum communication, DSQC protocols require the exchange of additional classical information for decoding of the message, whereas no such classical information is required in QSDC. It is not the purpose of the present work to elaborately discuss these aspects of secure quantum communication. In this work, we focus on two new aspects of secure quantum communication that have been introduced recently: (i) dynamic quantum secret sharing (DQSS) [25, 26, 27] and (ii) hierarchical quantum secret sharing (HQSS) ( [13] and references therein). These two recently introduced aspects of quantum communication are extremely relevant for practical applications and requirements in real life communication scenarios. In dynamic secret sharing there exists a boss usually referred to as Alice and she has several agents (say Bob and Charlie). Alice shares a secret with Bob and Charlie that they can recover with the help of each other. So far this is equivalent to quantum information splitting or the traditional quantum secret sharing protocol introduced by Hillery et al. in 1999 [6] . What makes it dynamic in the protocols proposed in Refs. [25, 26, 27] is the inclusion of the feature that an agent can always be added or dropped in the scheme. This has direct practical relevance in real life situations. Consider a company where Alice is a sales manager and her agents (Bob, Charlie, David, etc.) are salesmen. Now, depending on the sales, she may like to add or drop agents. Also, an agent may choose to quit for various reasons (e.g., illness, more lucrative offers from another company). This freedom of being able to recruit new agents and letting old agents quit is an essential requirement for all practical setups. However, this feature was missing in the traditional protocols of quantum secret sharing. A protocol with this feature is referred to as DQSS protocol. In 2013, Hsu et al. proposed the first protocol of DQSS [25] . It drew a lot of attention from the quantum cryptography community because of its practical relevance and almost immediately after its publication Hsu et al.'s proposal of DQSS, was criticized [28, 29] and two new protocols of DQSS [26, 27] were proposed. Specifically, Wang and Li [28] performed a cryptanalysis of the DQSS protocol of Hsu et al. [25] and showed that if the first and the last agent colluded with each other, they can obtain the secret key of the boss without including the other agents. Further, Liao et al. [29] have shown that the DQSS scheme of Hsu et al. is not completely secure if the new agents adopted in the scheme are not honest. Liao et al. also proposed a new protocol [26] of DQSS which is free from the collusion attack [28] and dishonest user's attack [29] . Jia et al. have also proposed a protocol of DQSS [27] . All these protocols of DQSS [25, 26, 27] use different types of quantum states. For example, Bell states and entanglement swapping was used in [25] , star-like cluster states were used in the protocol of Jia et al [27] and GHZ states were used in the protocol of Liao et al. [26] . In the following, we show that DQSS can be implemented using any quantum state by identifying that all protocols of QKD or DSQC can lead to DQSS. We arrive at this conclusion by noting from our earlier result [30] that every quantum state can be used to implement efficient protocols of DSQC and QKD. Thus, in brief, we can conclude that the aspect of dynamism in terms of addition and deletion of agents has been successfully included in the recent papers on DQSS [25, 26, 27] and it is possible to implement DQSS schemes using any arbitrary quantum state. However, no organizational hierarchy among the agents was present in the Hsu et al. protocol and it required Bell states. Another practically relevant scheme of modified quantum secret sharing is HQSS introduced by some of the present authors [13] . In HQSS all the agents are not equally powerful thus an organizational hierarchy exists. Several examples of important practical situations where use of HQSS is essential are provided in our earlier paper [13] . However, no investigation on the possibility of inclusion of new agents or dropping of agents were performed in the previous study on HQSS. In practical situations a realistic scheme of secret sharing should have both the features as all existing organizations have an internal hierarchy among the staff members and staff members have the right to take leave or resign. In what follows, we aim to combine these two features (i.e., dynamism and hierarchy) and propose a new protocol of hierarchical dynamic quantum secret sharing which will be immensely relevant for all practical applications. Further, we will show that it is quite easy to implement a protocol of dynamic quantum secret sharing as every protocol of QKD, quantum key agreement (QKA), DSQC and QSDC can be transformed to a protocol of hierarchical dynamic quantum secret sharing.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose a very simple protocol of dynamic quantum secret sharing that has all the advantages of Hsu et al.'s protocol of dynamic quantum secret sharing, but can be implemented using any protocol of QKD, QKA, QSDC or DSQC as the backbone of the proposed protocol. It is also shown that the proposed protocol has an intrinsic hierarchy among the agents and thus it can be viewed as a protocol of hierarchical dynamic quantum secret sharing. In Section 3, we discuss the security and other features of the protocol and specifically show that the proposed protocol can be modified to yield a protocol of controlled hierarchical dynamic quantum secret sharing and it can also be used to communicate meaningful information (instructions) among the agents. In Section 4, the proposed protocol is compared with the existing protocols in terms of qubit efficiency (for convenience of comparison, we ignore the hierarchical aspect here) and allowed features. Our analysis shows that the proposed protocol can be implemented with maximal efficiency. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5. Figure 1 : The hierarchical structure of the organization can be viewed as a tree. The lowest level agents are the leafs of the tree. Each agent is connected with his/her boss via a sub-protocol which may be any protocol of QKD, DSQC, QSDC or QKA, but all sub-protocol may not be composable. At least in case of BB84 protocol, proof of both composability of this tree and unconditional security is available. Indicating that BB84 protocol is a good choice of sub-protocol in this tree structure.
Simplified protocol of dynamic quantum secret sharing
Consider that Alice is the boss and she has l primary agents with whom she wishes to share a secret directly in a way that incorporates the dynamism (as discussed in the previous section).
Step 1 Alice and her i-th agent faithfully follow a specific protocol of QKD/QKA/DSQC/QSDC to generate an n-bit symmetric key K Ai = K i (i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l}) for secret sharing. For example, if Alice has two agents Bob and Charlie then after following the protocol independently with Bob and Charlie, Alice produces K A1 = K B and K A2 = K C , where the subscripts A, B, C stands for Alice, Bob and Charlie, respectively. Subsequently, Alice produces a master key
can be recovered by the agents iff all of them collaborate with each other.
Step 2 If a new agent David wants to join the protocol then he has two options. Either he can join directly with Alice and in that case he will be referred to as a primary agent or he could join a previously appointed primary agent (say Bob) as a secondary agent. Without loss of generality, we consider the case that he joins with Alice as the primary agent. In this case, Alice will faithfully follow a specific protocol of QKD/QKA/DSQC/QSDC to generate an n-bit symmetric key such that
Step 3 Alice will update her master key as
This would automatically include David as a primary agent since after updating of the master key by Alice, Bob and Charlie together will not be able to obtain the secret of Alice, unless David collaborates with them. In a similar manner agent Bob can collaborate with David and recruit him as a secondary agent.
Step 4 If an agent, say David, wants to quit the scheme then Alice (his immediate boss) would update her master key as
This operation will ensure that the secret of Alice can be recovered by users (agents) other than David, if all of them collaborate. The above description shows how a dynamic scheme of quantum secret sharing can be implemented in an unconditionally secure manner using any protocol that can be used for symmetric key distribution between two authenticated users. It is interesting to note that here the agents of Alice do not need to be quantum. All of them can be classical (i.e., restricted to classical operations: measurement and preparation of quantum states in the computational basis). This makes the protocol relevant in the context of several semi-quantum protocols of QKD which have been recently proposed ( [31] and references therein), where the schemes are implemented keeping Bob classical. The above protocol clearly shows that a successful implementation of QKD is sufficient for designing of a protocol of DQSS. Thus, by using a semi-quantum QKD scheme in the Step 1 of the above protocol we can easily obtain a protocol for semi-quantum DQSS. Following the same logic, we can state that as completely orthogonal-state-based implementation of QKD and DSQC/QSDC are possible ( [32] and references therein), it is possible to design completely orthogonal-state-based protocol of HQDSS.
Intrinsic hierarchy in the protocol
The scheme presented above has an inherent hierarchy present inside it which can be understood easily if we consider Alice as the boss (master) whose key is K M and Bob, Charlie and David as agents of Alice with the keys K B , K C and K D , respectively. Now let us suppose that a new agent, Elsa, joins the scheme such that she faithfully follows a secure protocol with Bob, who is an agent of Alice to share a symmetric key K E with him. After following the protocol Bob can update his key as K ′ B = K B ⊕ K E . Now if Bob uses the key K ′ B then all the agents Bob, Charlie, David and Elsa would be required to cooperate with each other to obtain the information shared by Alice. However, if Bob decides to use the key K B then the agents Bob, Charlie and David can bypass the agent Elsa to decode the secret of boss Alice. Thus a secondary agent is less powerful than a primary agent and this illustrates the intrinsic hierarchy present in this protocol of dynamic secret sharing. Specifically, if an agent joins the scheme by following the protocol with any agent other than Alice, then that agent's access to the information shared by Alice will be at the mercy of his immediate boss (say, Bob in the case of Elsa). Thus the new agent Elsa will be under the control of her boss, Bob. This implies that if the above mentioned scheme is used, then we can implement dynamism and hierarchy among the agents with the help of any protocol capable of sharing an n-bit key between two users.
Security of the protocol and its additional features
In the proposed protocol, it is obvious that the security of the protocol is equivalent to the security of the scheme used to obtain keys between a boss and his/her agents. For example, if Alice and Bob use BB84 (B92) protocol to obtain K A = K B then the security proof of BB84 (B92) would ensure the security of the present scheme. As BB84, B92 and other single-particle based protocols can also be used to implement dynamic quantum secret sharing, we may avoid the use of Bell states and Bell measurement in Hsu et al. protocol as this would reduce the requirement for quantum resources. Further, as we have shown that all the existing protocols of QKA, QKD. DSQC and QSDC can be turned into protocols equivalent to Hsu et al.'s protocol of dynamic secret sharing [30] . and thus the present version of the protocol provides many alternative ways of realization of dynamic secret sharing.
The collusion attack of the agents and the honesty check of a revoked agent
In the recent work of Liao et al. [26] , they have discussed two possible security issues related to the DQSS protocol proposed by them. Specifically, they discussed the security of their protocol against the collusion attack of a subset of the set of all agents. As in all the existing DQSS protocols the master key of the boss K M = K A1 ⊕K A2 ⊕· · ·⊕K A l is obtained by a modulo 2 summation over the keys of all the agents at level 1 (note that, except the present protocol of HDQSS, in all other protocols of DQSS all the agents are in the level 1 only), any collusion of n agents with n < l will never reveal K M . Further, in the proposed HDQSS, an agent of level p may decide to include some or all of his sub-agents in level p + 1. Thus, in the present protocol, it is allowed that all the agents of level 1 and all sub-agent of agent i who are located at level 2 cooperate to obtain the secret of the boss, but any collusion attack of a proper subset of the set of these agents will never lead to K M and consequently the present protocol in particular and all the existing DQSS protocols in general are free from collusion attack of a subset of agents. Further, Liao et al. discussed a complex revocation process, which in our opinion is not technically necessary. Technically, in our protocol a copy of the key of a particular agent belonging to level k is available with his immediate boss who is either an agent in level k − 1 or the ultimate boss. Thus, all that needs to be done now is that the immediate boss of the agent to be removed refreshes his key by performing an XOR operation of his key with the key of the agent to be removed.
Composability and related issues
The key insight in this work is the fact that the security of hierarchical quantum secret sharing schemes can be reduced to security of bipartite QKD. Note that similar ideas of reduction in the cryptographic context for orthogonal state based encoding is already discussed by some of the present authors ( [33] and references therein). The main requirement for the present reduction to work is that the bipartite QKD used must be composable [34] . The issue of composability arises when we wish to build a complicated, composite cryptographic protocol that uses simpler cryptographic primitives as subroutines. Thus, composability issue arises in the context of the proposed HDQSS protocol as from Fig. 1 , it is clearly evident that our protocol of HDQSS consists of a tree of sub-protocols. Specifically, the cryptographic protocol followed by Alice and her i-th agent to share a key K Ai in the Step1 of our protocol is a sub-protocol. Similarly, the protocol used by the jth agent of level p − 1 and his/her k-th agent (who is in level p) is a sub-protocol. Such sub-protocols that are present in a tree are referred to as the children of the tree. The primitives are called leaves. In our case all the agents of the lowest level are leaves of the tree. Similar argument related to the arise of composability issue is applicable to all the existing DQSS protocols. However, composability of the DQSS protocols are not discussed in any of the existing papers. The issue is important because a particular subprotocol may have stand-alone security, but may leak some information that could be harmful when it is part of a larger, parent protocol. Thus we require composability over and above the stand-alone security of the subprotocols.
The security of a complex cryptographic protocol (tree) is established by first establishing the security of the primitives and then using that result to obtain the security for the parent sub-protocols, and so on until one reaches the root of the tree (Alice/boss in our case) [35, 36] . This bottom-up approach is used to establish the security of the earlier proposed DQSS protocol and the same approach is adopted above to establish the security of our protocol. However, not all sub-protocols are expected to provide composability. A good choice of sub-protocol for the sharing of a key from an agent to his sub-agents may be the BB84 protocol 1 as it is composable [35] and unconditionally security [37] . Here it would be apt to note that the idea of sequential composability was introduced in Ref. [38] in the context of secure multi-party computation. In sequential composition, one allows primitive protocols to be composed arbitrarily provided that at any given time, precisely one instance of the protocol is being executed. Any other instance of the protocol can be executed only when the present instance halts. A stronger form of security is required for universal composability, in which the protocols being composed are allowed to run concurrently [39, 40] .
In composable security for the simulation paradigm, we require that the environment is unable to distinguish between the real protocol primitive from its ideal black box functionality. If this were not the case, then an adversary could potentially use environmental information about a previous run of the protocol embedded in the parent protocol. This information that the adversary receives from the environment could be in the form of a quantum state from the environment or entanglement with the environment. The general criteria for composable security in the quantum and classical contexts are presented in [36, 41] . In the present work, we require universal composability of unconditionally secure quantum key distribution, which is indeed known [35] . That is, it is shown in [35] that QKD (i.e., usual security definition for QKD) also entails composable security. This means that the key generated by a QKD subroutine in the hierarchy can indeed be used subsequently. As a consequence the protocol of HDQSS presented here is composable in all such situations where the subprotocols used are the protocols of QKD.
Promotion of an agent
In a practical organizational scenario, we need a hierarchy among staff and dynamism in the organization in the sense that a new staff can join or an old staff can resign or be terminated. The existence of these desirable features in our protocol is already discussed. However, in a realistic situation we need another feature: the possibility of growth of an employee. To be precise, an agent who is performing well in level l > 1 must have some option to be promoted to the level l − 1. The dynamic nature of the proposed HDQSS protocol automatically ensures that as it allows the agent at level l to resign from his present job and as it also allows another agent in level l − 2 to recruit him as a new agent of level l − 1.
Sending a meaningful classical message using the protocol
In the existing protocols of dynamic quantum secret sharing only a key is shared among agents of Alice as the master key K M is generated via probabilistic outcomes of the measurement. The same would be the case here if we use a protocol like BB84 or any protocol of QKA in Step 1 of our protocol. However, it is straightforward to understand that at a later time (after the key K M is shared among the agents as
Alice can use the key to send an instruction (information) to her agents using the key. As Kerckhoff's principle defines that a message is secure when encrypted with a secure key, the unconditional security of the shared key would implement unconditional security of the shared message. To be more precise, if Alice wishes to send a message M A she may publicly announce S A = K M ⊕ M A and subsequently all her agents can collaborate to obtain
Turning the protocol into a protocol of controlled secret sharing
Now it may be of interest for Alice to share the key at some time, but not to allow her agents to collaborate and produce the key till she desires that the agents do so. For example, consider that the President of a country (Alice) shares a key that would require opening the switch to a nuclear weapon among chiefs of army, navy and air force, but the president does not want that the agents collaborate among themselves and open the weapon at a time not desired by her. In such a situation, Alice would require to have a control over the key. This control may be ensured in several ways. For example, Alice may create a shared key with all her agents as follows
and K i is a n-bit sequence and Π n is a permutation operator that randomly permutes an n-bit sequence. Now, as Π n is unknown to David, he does not know K ′ D and consequently Bob, Charlie and David are not allowed to obtain K M till Alice allows them to do so by disclosing the detail of permutation operations applied by her (say, when she considers it is the right time to open the nuclear weapon).
Efficiency of the proposed protocol
Efficiency of quantum communication protocols is calculated using two analogous but different parameters. The first one is simply defined as
where c is the total number of classical bits (message bits) transmitted/shared using the protocol and q denotes the total number of qubits used for the purpose [42, 43] . This measure has been used by Liao et al [26] in their recent work on DQSS [26] to establish that their protocol is more efficient than the earlier proposed DQSS protocol of Hsu et al. [25] and Jia et al. [27] . Their claim is not completely correct. Before we illustrate this point let us find out an upper bound on η 1 for DQSS protocols. For convenience of comparison with the earlier works we consider an m-party DQSS scheme with Alice as the boss having (m − 1) agents. Now Alice has to implement a sub-protocol with each of these agents. The maximum efficiency for each of these sub-protocols can be
. This is so because if 2x qubits (consider a random mix of verification qubits and message qubits) travel through a quantum channel accessible to Eve and the possibility of eavesdropping is checked by using x of them, then for any δ > 0, the probability of obtaining less than δn errors on the verification qubits, and more than (δ +ǫ)n errors on the remaining x qubits is asymptotically less than exp[−O(ǫ 2 x)] for large x [44, 45] . Thus to ensure the unconditional security of the sub-protocol operating between Alice and her ith agent of level 1, it is required that they (Alice and her specific agent) check half of travel qubits for eavesdropping. Thus, η 1max = . This bound can be achieved by using different sub-protocols as in our earlier works where we have described a large number of protocols with η 1 = 1 2 (cf. [30, 44, 46] ). In what follows we have assumed that in the DQSS protocol proposed here one of the maximally efficient QKD or QSDC protocol proposed in Refs. [30, 44, 46] is used as sub-protocols and consequently η 1 for our protocol is 1 2(m−1) . The simple measure described above (1) does not include the classical communication that is required for decoding of information in case a DSQC protocol is used as the sub-protocol. Further, for implementation of any DQSS scheme one of the users will finally recover the secret of the boss and for that he/she would require the help of other agents. Thus, in the implementation of an m-party DQSS m − 2 agents must send one bit of information to the agent responsible for the recovery of the secret of Alice (boss). Consequently, even if we apply a QKD/QSDC sub-protocol we need an additional m − 2 bits of classical information for final decoding of the 1 bit secret key of the boss. As η 1 does not include these classical bits, so it may be considered as a weak measure. There exists another measure of efficiency [47] that is frequently used and includes the classical communication and is given as
where b is the number of classical bits exchanged for decoding of the message (classical communications used for checking of eavesdropping are not counted). So for our protocol b = m − 2 and consequently the maximum value of
Similarly, one can obtain values of η 2 for other existing protocols of DQSS [25, 26, 27] , too. However, we have not tried that here as a comparison of the efficiencies of the existing protocols of DQSS has already been presented in the recent work of Liao et al. [26] using η 1 . Following them we and compare our protocol with the existing protocols in Table 1 . From the third row of the Table 1 , we can easily observe that for three-party DQSS, our protocol is more efficient than Liao et al.'s protocol which in turn is more efficient compared to Hsu et al.'s protocol. Liao et al. used this merit of their protocol to establish their protocol as superior to the protocol of Hsu et al. in terms of efficiency. However, the benefit of better quit efficiency disappears for asymptotically large m values. To specifically elaborate this point in the next row of the Table 1 , we have provided η 1 for all the protocols for a 50-party DQSS. We can easily see that for 50-party DQSS efficiency of our protocol, and that of Liao et al. protocol [26] and Hsu et al. protocol [25] is practically the same. Apart from achieving the maximum possible efficiency, the proposed protocol has some more advantages over the existing protocols. These advantages are summarized in the last two rows of Table 1. Hsu et al. protocol [25] Jia et al. protocol [27] Liao et al. protocol [26] Proposed protocol (using a maximally efficient sub-protocol of QKD or QSDC described in Refs. [30, 44, 46] Qubit efficiency η 1 (m-party DQSS) 
Conclusions
To conclude, in this paper, we have proposed a simplified protocol of HDQSS. The protocol is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it includes features from recently introduced ideas of HQSS and DQSS. Secondly, it can be implemented by using a large number of alternative protocols of secure quantum communication as sub-protocols. More specifically, the proposed protocol can be implemented using any existing protocol of QKD, QSDC, DSQC or QD. Further, it is also possible to design a semi-quantum protocol of HDQSS and in principle the protocols of HDQSS can be implemented by using any quantum state as in Ref. [30] we have already established that any arbitrary quantum state can be used to implement maximally efficient protocols of QKD, DSQC and QSDC. Finally, the protocol has some features (e.g., hierarchy in the organization, dynamism, possibility of promotion of the agents, etc.) that were not simultaneously present in any of the existing protocols of related tasks. Further, in this work we have also discussed security of the proposed protocol against eavesdropping and collusion attack with special attention to the issues related to composability which is extremely relevant to the complex protocols of this kind that are essentially built by using several sub-protocols. The efficiency of the proposed protocol is compared with that of other existing protocols of DQSS and it is shown that the presented protocol has better efficiency when a small number of agents are involved, but the efficiency is practically the same as that of the protocols of Hsu et al. and Liao et al. when a large number of agents are present.
Here it would be apt to note that in the present paper we have assumed that the immediate boss of an agent keeps a copy of the key that he/she shares with that particular agent and thus the boss enjoys the privilege of kicking out an agent at her whim. Interestingly, some security reasons may lead to a situation where the immediate boss of the agent is not allowed to store the key that he shares with the agent. This would lead to a very different scenario. Specifically, in this situation the boss would require the agent to give his/her key in order to eliminate him/her, thus bringing in his integrity into the picture. However, if we assume that the station of Alice and each of the agents (i.e., all the nodes in the graph shown in Fig. 1 ) are secure, then classical information (shared key) can be securely stored and the above said integrity of the agent will not be required. Further, it may be noted that the completely orthogonal-state-based realization of HDQSS protocol is also possible as completely orthogonal-statebased realization of QKD, QSDC and DSQC are possible [4, 30, 32] . Finally, as the proposed protocol is extremely relevant for various practical situations and it is possible to implement it using various alternative sub-protocols that are already experimentally realized, we hope that experimentalists will find it interesting to implement this HDQSS scheme and the idea discussed here will substantially contribute to the development of future implementations of secure quantum communication schemes.
